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INTRODUCTION
These Remarks focus on the law’s balance between rights and
responsibilities. In particular, they center on the law designed to pro-
tect the victims of armed conflict, known by various titles over the
centuries, including the law of arms, the law of war, the law of armed
conflict, and international humanitarian law.
The president of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) introduced the organization’s 1995 annual report by high-
lighting a few facts which indicate the huge challenges that this area
of law and those responsible for it face: in the 120 conflicts since the
end of World War II, twenty-two million people have been killed.1
An overwhelming percentage of the deaths are of noncombatants
and occurred in non-international armed conflicts. Thirty such con-
flicts continue to rage, with tragic consequences for their countless
victims.2 The figures from the world wars in the first part of the cen-
tury are even worse. Professor Paul Kennedy, in his acclaimed The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, estimates the final casualty toll for
the extended period of World War I at sixty million.3 World War II
resulted in 13.6 million German military casualties and between
twenty and twenty-five million Soviet deaths (including civilians).4
These dreadful figures highlight one consequence of the breach
of the basic rule that disputes should be settled by peaceful means.
Of course, the very existence of the body of law considered in this
paper reflects the unhappy but realistic expectation that this basic
rule will be breached. The figures also suggest breaches of that body
of law regulating the use of deadly force—although they are not con-
clusive since by its very nature the waging of war involves lawful
killing.
1. See ICRC, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 ICRC ANNUAL REPORT].
2. See id. The 1998 Chart of Armed Conflict included in THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 1998/99 (1998), provides the information
in striking graphic form.
The vital, central role of the ICRC in this area of law is brilliantly captured in CAROLINE
MOOREHEAD, DUNANT’S DREAM: WAR, SWITZERLAND AND THE HISTORY OF THE RED
CROSS (1998), the first major history based on the newly available archives of the ICRC.
3. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 278 (1987). Ken-
nedy’s extended period includes fighting and massacres in post-war border conflicts that oc-
curred in Eastern European countries such as Armenia and Poland, and the influenza epidemic
that raged from 1918 to 1919. See id.
4. See id. at 361-62.
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These Remarks use as their starting point some actual situations
from a battle long ago. I then identify some enduring issues, espe-
cially legal issues, that arise from these situations. The various issues
relate, among other things, to four primary themes:
• the roles of the executive government, the military, the legisla-
ture, the courts, and educational bodies (notably the universi-
ties) in developing the law of war
• the processes for the making, development, and implementation
of the law
• the relationships between the law, moral and ethical principles,
and military necessity
• the jurisprudential analysis of rights and duties
THE BATTLE OF AGINCOURT
We begin in 1415, in a forest in northern France on the day be-
fore the famous battle at Agincourt between the forces of the English
King Henry V and those of the French King Charles VI. My principal
source will be William Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth.5
Bardolph, an English soldier who had been a drinking mate of
the young Prince Henry, had been apprehended for stealing a pax
from a church. King Henry confirmed that Bardolph should be
hanged. According to Raphael Holinshed’s Chronicle, on which
Shakespeare drew very heavily, the King had
caused proclamation to be made, that no person should be so hardie,
on paine of death, either to take anie thing out of anie church that
belonged to the same; or to hurt or doo anie violence either to
priests, women, or anie such as should be found without weapon or
armor, and not readie to make resistance.
5. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY THE FIFTH (1599), in 3 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (David Bevington ed., Bantam Books 1998). I am greatly indebted to
Theodor Meron’s pioneering works. See THEODOR MERON, HENRY’S WARS AND
SHAKESPEARE’S LAWS (1993); Theodor Meron, Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Law of
War, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1992); see also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A
MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 17-20 (2d ed. 1992).
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Yet in this great necessitie, the poore people of the countrie
were not spoiled, nor anie thing taken of them without paiment.6
Shakespeare makes the point forcefully and elegantly:
King Henry:
What men have you lost, Fluellen?
Fluellen:
. . . I think the Duke hath lost never a man, but one that is like
to be executed for robbing a church, one Bardolph, if your Maj-
esty know the man. His face is all bubukles, and whelks, and
knobs, and flames o’ fire, and his lips blows at his nose, and it is
like a coal of fire, sometimes plue and sometimes red; but his
nose is executed, and his fire’s out.
King Henry:
We would have all such offenders so cut off. And we give ex-
press charge that, in our marches through the country, there be
nothing compelled from the villages, nothing taken but paid for,
none of the French upbraided or abused in disdainful language;
for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler
gamester is the soonest winner.7
That rule—and the punishment of its breach by execution—
concerned the duties of the individual soldier and the corresponding
rights of the noncombatant not to be the subject of armed force.
But what about the responsibilities of the leader, both for waging
the war and for the actions of his men? Early on the morning before
the battle, a disguised King Henry discussed those matters with some
of his men:
King Henry:
. . . Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the
King’s company, his cause being just and his quarrel honorable.
6. HOLINSHED’S CHRONICLE AS USED IN SHAKESPEARE’S PLAYS 79 (Allardyce Nicoll &
Josephine Nicoll eds., 1927) [hereinafter HOLINSHED’S CHRONICLE]. The language of the
King’s proclamation closely follows The Statutes and Ordinaunces to Be Keped in Time of
Werre, § 3 (c. 1419), reprinted in THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY 282, 283 (Travers
Twiss ed., London, Longman & Co. 1871). In an even earlier case, a marshal of the army im-
posed a judgment of the loss of a hand for theft of a cow from a churchyard. See ROLLS OF THE
JUSTICES IN EYRE FOR YORKSHIRE 1218–19 para. 851, at 310-11 (Doris Mary Stenton ed.,
1937).
7. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 5, act 3, sc. 6, ll. 97-113.
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Williams:
That’s more than we know.
Bates:
Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough if
we know we are the King’s subjects. If his cause be wrong, our
obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.
Williams:
But if the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy
reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads,
chopped off in a battle, shall join together at the Latter Day and
cry all, “We died at such a place”—some swearing, some crying
for a surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them,
some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly
left. I am afeard there are few die well that die in a battle; for
how can they charitably dispose of anything, when blood is their
argument? Now, if these men do not die well, it will be a black
matter for the King that led them to it . . . .
King Henry:
So, if a son that is by his father sent about merchandise do sin-
fully miscarry upon the sea, the imputation of his wickedness, by
your rule, should be imposed upon his father that sent him . . . .
But this is not so. The King is not bound to answer the particular
endings of his soldiers, [nor] the father of his son . . . ; for they
purpose not their deaths when they propose their services. Be-
sides, there is no king, be his cause never so spotless . . . can try
it out with all unspotted soldiers. . . .  Every subject’s duty is the
King’s; but every subject’s soul is his own. . . .
Williams:
’Tis certain, every man that dies ill, the ill upon his own head,
the King is not to answer it.
Bates:
I do not desire he should answer for me, and yet I determine to
fight lustily for him.8
The next event occurs near the end of the battle. In contrast to
the incident of the pax, it concerns rules applicable during the battle
and the sanctions that might be available to respond to breaches of
the rules. Some French horsemen, hearing that the English tents were
some way from their army and were not sufficiently guarded, robbed
8. Id. act 4, sc. 1, ll. 126-89.
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the tents, carried away caskets, and killed the boys who were in
charge of them. In Shakespeare’s version, it is the redoubtable Welsh
soldier, Fluellen, who states the legal proposition which had been
breached: “Kill the poys and the luggage! ’Tis expressly against the
law of arms. ’Tis as arrant a piece of knavery, mark you now, as can
be offert; in your conscience, now, is it not?”9
In response, Henry orders reprisals against the French prisoners
who had been taken in the course of the day. According to Gower (in
Shakespeare’s version):
Gower:
’Tis certain there’s not a boy left alive; and the cowardly rascals
that ran from the battle ha’ done this slaughter. Besides, they
have burned and carried away all that was in the King’s tent,
wherefore the King most worthily hath caused every soldier to
cut his prisoner’s throat. O ’tis a gallant king!10
This version of events follows Holinshed:
But when the outcrie of the lackies and boies, which ran awaie for
feare of the Frenchmen thus spoiling the campe, came to the kings
eares, he, (doubting least his enimies should gather togither againe,
and begin a new field; and mistrusting further that the prisoners
would be an aid to his enimies, or the verie enimies to their takers in
deed if they were suffered to liue,) contrarie to his accustomed gen-
tlenes, commanded by sound of trumpet, that euerie man (vpon
paine of death) should incontinentlie slaie his prisoner.11
Shakespeare is perhaps somewhat equivocal about what really
happened:
King Henry:
I was not angry since I came to France
Until this instant. Take a trumpet, herald;
Ride thou unto the horsemen on yond hill.
If they will fight with us, bid them come down,
Or void the field. They do offend our sight.
If they’ll do neither, we will come to them,
And make them skirr away as swift as stones
Enforcèd from the old Assyrian slings.
Besides, we’ll cut the throats of those we have,
9. Id. act 4, sc. 7, ll. 1-4.
10. Id. act 4, sc. 7, ll. 5-10.
11. HOLINSHED’S CHRONICLE, supra note 6, at 82-83.
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And not a man of them that we shall take
Shall taste our mercy. Go and tell them so.12
In the Branagh film version the reprisal order is completely
omitted.13 Rather, the film moves directly to the King confronting the
French herald, Mountjoy, in the final event from the battle to which I
wish to call attention. The English archers had achieved an over-
whelming victory over the heavily armored French in a very cramped
and flooded battle field. According to Holinshed, the French side lost
10,000 men, while the English side lost fewer than thirty.14 Mountjoy
asks for assistance in clearing the battlefield. The King agrees:
Exeter:
Here comes the herald of the French, my Liege.
Gloucester:
His eyes are humbler than they used to be.
King Henry:
How now, what means this, herald? Know’st thou not
That I have fined these bones of mine for ransom?
Com’st thou again for ransom?
Mountjoy:
No, great King.
I come to thee for charitable license,
That we may wander o’er this bloody field
To book our dead and then to bury them,
To sort our nobles from our common men.
For many of our princes—woe the while!—
Lie drowned and soaked in mercenary blood . . . .
O give us leave, great King,
To view the field in safety, and dispose
Of their dead bodies!
King Henry:
I tell thee truly, herald,
I know not if the day be ours or no . . . .
Mountjoy:
The day is yours.
12. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 5, act 4, sc. 7, ll. 54-64.
13. See HENRY V (Samuel Goldwyn Co. 1989).
14. HOLINSHED’S CHRONICLE, supra note 6, at 84-85.
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King Henry:
Praised be God, and not our strength, for it!15
The events of that very distant war present at least six matters
that are of continuing importance: (1) the substantive rules that are
recognized in statements or actions, including breaches of the rules;
(2) the importance of rules which protect the means of communica-
tion—that is the importance of procedural rules, in addition to sub-
stantive ones; (3) the different levels of responsibility; (4) the legal
character of the rules; (5) the existence of both positive and negative
obligations; and (6) the sanctions that are available to enforce com-
pliance with the rules.
I. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL LIMITS ON WARFARE
We begin with the essential proposition of military strategy and
tactics (and of law and ethics) that wars are limited. Sir Michael
Howard, one of the great military historians of our time, distinguishes
“between ‘war’ on the one hand and riot, piracy, brigandage, gener-
alized insurrection and random violence on the other. The wars of
which we speak consist of the purposive and instrumental use of force
by legitimized authorities.”16
A basic rule divides combatants from non-combatants. A central
proposition, reflected in the rule breached by Bardolph, is that mem-
bers of the armed forces shall not take action directed against non-
combatants.17 Between 1974 and 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Diplomatic Confer-
ence], attended by representatives from over 100 countries, was con-
vened to update the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Diplomatic Con-
15. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 5, act 4, sc. 7, ll. 65-87.
16. Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can War be Controlled?, in RESTRAINTS ON
WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 1-2 (Michael Howard ed., 1979).
Similarly, Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (concerned with non-international
armed conflicts) excludes from its scope, “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 1,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter Protocol II].
17. See ICRC, 1978 Red Cross Fundamental Rules of International Humanitarian Law Ap-
plicable in Armed Conflicts, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 469 (Adam Rob-
erts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989). These fundamental rules are reprinted in the Appen-
dix to these Remarks.
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ference resulted in the drafting of two Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions: Protocol I, which covers international armed
conflicts,18 and Protocol II, which covers non-international armed
conflicts.19 Both protocols establish the following basic standard for
any military conflict: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of
the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objec-
tives.”20 One hundred fifty-two states are now formally bound by that
provision.21 A few years before the protocols were introduced, the
Second Vatican Council, emphasizing that inherent limits on warfare
were not a mere legal quibble, made this memorable declaration:
“Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire
cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime
against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating
condemnation.”22
Agincourt was a war between two states, and the 1977 basic rule
applies to such international armed conflicts. But as noted previously,
an overwhelming percentage of the armed conflicts that have oc-
curred over the last fifty years have been internal.23 Internal armed
conflicts are, of course, not new—take the U.S. Civil War, for exam-
ple. During that war, the need to establish rules for the behavior of
Union soldiers toward the soldiers and civilians of the Confederate
States prompted Francis Lieber to draft General Orders No. 100,24
which President Lincoln promulgated on April 24, 1863.
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I].
19. Protocol II, supra note 16.
20. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 48, at 25; see also id. art. 51, at 26 (prescribing rules for
the protection of civilians); Protocol II, supra note 16, art. 13, at 615 (same).
21. See Accession to the Additional Protocols by Grenada, 325 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 742,
742 (1998). One hundred forty-four states are parties to Protocol II. See id.
22. Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World, para. 80 (1965), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY
HERITAGE 222 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
23. This information can be found in the 1998 Chart of Armed Conflict, supra note 2.
24. Adjutant General’s Office, General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government
of the Armies of the United States in the Field (1863) (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1898), re-
printed in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Ji Toman eds., 1988) [hereinafter General
Orders No. 100].
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One of Lieber’s admirers was General Henry W. Halleck, a no-
table author in the field of international law.25 Halleck first sought as-
sistance from Lieber in defining the role of guerrillas in warfare. In
late 1862, Lieber persuaded General Halleck and other authorities in
the Lincoln administration that there should be a set of rules promul-
gated for the armies of the United States.26 He reminded Halleck
when he was preparing General Orders No. 100 that nothing of the
kind existed in any language. He claimed to have no guide, no
groundwork, no textbook. “Usage, history, reason, and conscien-
tiousness, a sincere love of truth, justice and civilization,” he said, had
been his guides.27 The rules stated in General Orders No. 100 have
had a significant impact on the later development of both United
States and international law.28
Lieber was a man of extraordinary talent and energy. At the
time he prepared General Orders No. 100, he was Professor of Mod-
ern History and Political Science, as well as of International, Civil,
and Common Law at Columbia College in New York and had earlier
been a Professor at South Carolina College. Professor Paul Carring-
ton, in a notable study of Lieber’s work, states that “[i]t is unjust that
few contemporary American law teachers are familiar with [Lieber’s]
work.”29
General Orders No. 100 dealt with both international and inter-
nal armed conflicts. Of the former, it stated:
25. See, e.g., H.W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAWS OF WAR
(1866); HENRY W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1861).
26. Lieber had a special and general interest in the law of war—as a young man he had
fought against Napoleon’s forces; two of his three sons were members of the Union army; and
his other son was a member of the Confederate army and had been killed. See RICHARD
SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 6-7 (1983).
27. Id. at 10 (quoting Letter from Francis Lieber to General Henry W. Halleck (Feb. 20,
1863), in The Lieber Papers, The Huntington Collection).
28. This impact is reflected, for instance, in a memorandum showing the close relationship
between General Orders No. 100 and the Hague Convention with respect to the law and cus-
toms of war on land, which U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root appended to a most laudatory
address about Lieber that he gave on the 50th Anniversary of the U.S. government’s adoption
of General Orders No. 100. See Elihu Root, Francis Lieber, 7 AM. J. INT’L L. 453, 466-67
(1913).
29. Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political Ethics
of Francis Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339, 356 (1992) [hereinafter Carrington, Political Ethics]
(“When he died in 1872, . . . he was the most renowned American law teacher. He was honored
in many other nations.”); see also Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the
Lieber Revival, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2135, 2152 (1995) (concluding that “it is indeed time for
another Lieber revival”).
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The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries
occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private property;
the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women; and the
sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be
rigorously punished.
This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious in-
vader to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to
billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands,
boats or ships, and churches, for temporary and military uses.30
The proposition about the immunity of strictly private property
is qualified to some extent by the following proposition in Article 38:
Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses of the
owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the sup-
port or other benefit of the army or of the United States.
If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause re-
ceipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated owner to obtain in-
demnity.31
In addition, Article 22 stated that “[t]he principle has been more
and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in
person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will
admit.”32
General William T. Sherman, in one of his wartime letters, indi-
cated further limits on the immunity of non-combatants in internal
armed conflicts, but he emphasized that the law of war in some form
continued to apply:
In Europe, whence we derive our principles of war, wars are be-
tween kings or rulers through hired armies, and not between peo-
ples. These remain, as it were, neutral, and sell their produce to
whatever army is in possession. . . .
[T]he general rule was and is that war is confined to the armies
engaged, and should not visit the houses of families or private inter-
ests. . . .
[But t]he war which now prevails in our land is essentially a war
of races [with consequences for the rules which apply:] . . . .
When men take up arms to resist a rightful authority, we are
compelled to use like force, because all reason and argument cease
when arms are resorted to. When the provisions, forage, horses,
30. General Orders No. 100, supra note 24, art. 37, at 9.
31. Id., art. 38, at 9.
32. Id., art. 22, at 7.
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mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is clearly our duty and
right to take them also, because otherwise they might be used
against us. In like manner all houses left vacant by an inimical peo-
ple are clearly our right, and as such are needed as storehouses, hos-
pitals, and quarters.
But the question arises as to dwellings used by women, children,
and non-combatants. So long as non-combatants remain in their
houses and keep to their accustomed peaceful business, their opin-
ions and prejudices can in no wise influence the war, and therefore
should not be noticed; but if any one comes out into the public
streets and creates disorder, he or she should be punished, re-
strained, or banished to the rear or front, as the officer in command
adjudges. If the people, or any of them, keep up a correspondence
with parties in hostility, they are spies, and can be punished accord-
ing to law with death or minor punishment.
These are well-established principles of war, and the people of
the South having appealed to war, are barred from appealing for
protection to our constitution, which they have practically and pub-
licly defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide its rules and
laws.33
The final section of General Orders No. 100, which addresses
situations of insurrection, civil war, and rebellion, also reflects the
lessened protections accorded to non-combatants in non-
international armed conflicts.34 While Article 155 makes the clear dis-
tinction in “regular war” between the two general classes of
“combatants and noncombatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile
government,”35 that provision and Article 156 go on to distinguish in
the case of a “war of rebellion” between loyal and disloyal citizens
“in revolted territories.”36 Common justice and expediency require
that the former be protected, but the commander, as much as it lies in
his power, will throw the burden of the war on disloyal citizens.
Similarly, the modern law draws an important line between the two
types of conflict.37 That distinction was dramatically manifested at the
33. Letter from Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman to Maj. R.M. Sawyer (Jan. 31, 1864), in
SIR BASIL LIDDELL HART, THE SWORD AND THE PEN: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORLD’S
GREATEST MILITARY WRITINGS 164-66 (Adrian Liddell Hart ed., 1976).
34. See General Orders No. 100, supra note 24, arts. 155-56, at 22.
35. Id. art. 155, at 22.
36. Id. arts. 155-56, at 22.
37. This distinction is found for example in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions for the Protection of War Victims, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions of
1949]. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in
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final session of the Diplomatic Conference which prepared the 1977
Additional Protocols when the Conference voted to remove large
parts of the protective provisions included in the draft of Protocol
II.38
Some modern developments are perhaps more positive. For ex-
ample, in a notable recent judgment, the Appeals Chamber of the In-
ternational Tribunal on Yugoslavia affirmed that customary rules (in
addition to treaty-based ones) govern internal strife:
These rules . . . cover such areas as protection of civilians from hos-
tilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civil-
ian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those
who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as
prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed
conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities.39
                                                                                                                                     
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32
[hereinafter Geneva Convention No. I] (stating that the article applies only to “armed conflict
not of an international character occurring [with]in [a] . . . territory”); Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention No. II] (same); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. III]
(same); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV]
(same). This distinction is then reiterated in the particular subject matter of each of those Con-
ventions. See Geneva Convention No. I, supra, art. 14, 6 U.S.T. at 3124, 75 U.N.T.S. at 40
(stating that “the wounded and sick of a belligerent who fall into enemy hands” are to be
treated just as any other prisoner of war); Geneva Convention No. II, supra, art. 16, 6 U.S.T. at
3230, 75 U.N.T.S. at 96 (“[T]he wounded, sick and shipwrecked of a belligerent who fall into
enemy hands shall be prisoners of war, and the provisions of international law concerning pris-
oners of war shall apply to them.”); Geneva Convention No. III, supra, arts. 4-5, 6 U.S.T. at
3322-23, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-43 (drawing distinctions between belligerents and nonbelligerents);
Geneva Convention No. IV, supra,  arts. 4-5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290-93 (same).
38. Compare Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 1, at 7 (expressly including within its protection
“armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupa-
tion”), with Protocol II, supra note 16, art. 3, at 611 (expressly excluding applicability to situa-
tions where a government seeks “to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to
defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State”). Brief accounts of the history
behind Protocol II may be found in THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT:
PROTOCOL II TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS, at x-xi, 3-10 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1987)
[hereinafter LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT]; MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL.,
NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977
PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 604-17, 667-74 (1982).
The diplomatic record of this session is found in 7 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 59-251 (1974-77).
39. Prosecutor v. Tadi, U.N. Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Se-
rious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former
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More importantly, the chamber ruled that individuals could be
found criminally responsible for the breach of such rules, as is of
course the case with international armed conflicts.40 In support of that
conclusion, the chamber quoted New Zealand41 and American mili-
tary manuals.42
Similarly, those responsible for preparing the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, which came into force on
March 1, 1999, refused to draw the distinction.43 The Convention ap-
plies in absolute terms, without regard to the character of the armed
conflict.44
I return to Professor Lieber and to one critical aspect of his
treatment of civil wars. General Orders No. 100 makes explicit what
would have been implicit from the very situation in which it was is-
sued: humanity requires the adoption of at least some of the law of
war towards rebels. The Union’s application of the law to the rebels,
however, in no way meant that the Union was recognizing—either
partly or completely—the Confederate government as an independ-
ent and sovereign power:
Neutrals have no right to make the adoption of the rules of war
by the assailed government toward rebels the ground of their own
acknowledgment of the revolted people as an independent power.
Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war, exchanging them,
concluding of cartels, capitulations, or other warlike agreements
with them; addressing officers of a rebel army by the rank they may
have in the same; accepting flags of truce; or, on the other hand,
proclaiming Martial Law in their territory, or levying war-taxes or
                                                                                                                                     
Yugoslavia since 1991, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (App. Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35
I.L.M. 32, 69-70 (1996).
40. See id. at 70.
41. See id. (“[T]he . . . New Zealand [manual] . . . provides that ‘while non-application [i.e.
breaches of common Article 3] would appear to render those responsible liable to trial for “war
crimes,” trials would be held under national criminal law, since no “war” would be in existence
. . . .’”) (quoting NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE DIRECTORATE OF LEGAL SERVICES, LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL (1992)).
42. See id. (“The relevant provisions of the manual of the United States . . . may also lend
themselves to the interpretation that ‘war crimes’, i.e., ‘every violation of the law of war’, in-
clude infringement of common Article 3.”) (quoting UNITED STATES DEP’T OF DEFENSE, THE
LAW OF LAND WARFARE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL (1956)).
43. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997).
44. See id., art. 9, at 1515 (“Each State Party shall take all appropriate . . . measures . . . to
prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken
by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.”).
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forced loans, or doing any other act sanctioned or demanded by the
law and usages of public war between sovereign belligerents, neither
proves nor establishes an acknowledgment of the rebellious people,
or of the government which they may have erected, as a public or
sovereign power. Nor does the adoption of the rules of war toward
rebels imply an engagement with them extending beyond the limits
of these rules. It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles
the future relations between the contending parties.45
In the context of the treatment of prisoners of war, General Or-
ders No. 100 also made it clear that no connection was to be made be-
tween the justness of the cause and the application of the law:
The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war
upon another sovereign state, and, therefore, admits of no rules or
laws different from those of regular warfare, regarding the treatment
of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the army of a gov-
ernment which the captor may consider as a wanton and unjust as-
sailant.46
Thus, President Lincoln and his government made the funda-
mental distinction, in exact conformity with the law and practice of
the world community both before (as King Henry’s discussion with
his men shows47) and since, between the ius ad bellum, the law gov-
erning the right to use armed force, and the ius in bello, the law gov-
erning the conduct of an armed conflict once it has begun.48 It is un-
fortunate that President Reagan and his advisers did not recognize
this important distinction as well, when, in 1987, they rejected the
possibility that the United States would ratify Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva convention.49 Others have clearly demonstrated that Protocol
45. General Orders No. 100, supra note 24, arts. 152-53, at 22.
46. Id., art. 67, at 12.
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
48. Cf. H. Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 206, 239 (1953) (stating that an aggressor can invoke for its benefit the rules of warfare
applying to the actual conduct of the hostilities); Krysztof Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States,
Collective Security, Law of War and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
739, 808-12 (Max Sørensen ed., 1968) (describing the differing applications of the law to lawful
and unlawful belligerents); infra text accompanying note 75.
49. The formal rejection process began with President Reagan’s letter to the Senate on
January 29, 1987, reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 910, 911 (1987) (“Protocol I is fundamentally
and irreconcilably flawed. It contains provisions that would undermine humanitarian law and
endanger civilians in war.”). Some of the signs that the United States would ultimately reject
Protocol I had already appeared in the earlier writings of Reagan administration officials. For
example, Lt. Col. Burrus M. Carnahan of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Ad-
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I was not a carte blanche for rebels and terrorists;50 this was not an in-
stance of “la trahison des clercs” (the treachery of the intellectuals) as
some of the more inflamed rhetoric suggested. That rhetoric perhaps
once endangered the sensible interpretation of the Protocol’s text,
but it since has been outweighed by the ratification of the Protocol by
152 states—including all but two of the western alliance—and by the
statements of interpretation which many states have made. In addi-
tion, by 1987, the “wars of national liberation” in Southern Africa
and in the wider Portuguese empire, with which the Diplomatic Con-
ference had been concerned, had ended.51 Even by 1977, when the
                                                                                                                                     
ditional Protocol I: A Military View, 19 AKRON L. REV. 543 (1986). Lt. Col. Carnahan argued
that Protocol I should not be adopted by the United States because its rules could not be im-
plemented practically. See id. at 549. Douglas J. Feith, Reagan’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, wrote Law in the Service of Terror—The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 1
NAT’L INTEREST 36 (1985) and Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 AKRON
L. REV. 531, 534 (1986) (arguing that “the upshot of the . . . Conference was a pro-terrorist
treaty that calls itself humanitarian law.”). Maj. Guy B. Roberts, Assistant Staff Judge Advo-
cate, published The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional
Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 109 (1985). Maj. Roberts stated that “the major provisions of Pro-
tocol I are not only unacceptable politically, militarily and practically, but they may be de-
scribed as ‘advancing progressively backwards’ in affording protections for non-combatants.”
Id. at 166 (quoting F.R. Ribeiro, International Humanitarian Law: Advancing Progressively
Backwards, 97 S. AFRICAN L.J. 42, 42 (1980)). Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the
Department of State, wrote about Protocol I in his article Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN
AFF. 901 (1986). Judge Sofaer alleged that Protocol I “placed [law] very much at the service of
those who embrace political violence.” Id. at 922.
50. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to
Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 693, 719 (1986) (arguing that Proto-
col I is “consistent with the interests of the United States”); George H. Aldrich, Prospects for
United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1, 1 (1991) (“It is apparent that President Reagan’s decision [not to ratify] resulted
from misguided advice that . . . misconstrued a humanitarian and antiterrorist instrument as
one that could give aid and comfort to ‘terrorists.’”); George H. Aldrich, Some Reflections on
the Origins of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 129, 137
(Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aldrich, Some Reflections] (“Protocol I is a major
accomplishment for international law and for human rights, and it should be ratified univer-
sally.”); Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
912, 913 (1987) (“Protocol I neither recognizes terrorist groups nor legitimizes terrorist acts.”);
Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Ge-
neva Protocol I, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 678, 686 (1994) (“Protocol I is undoubtedly a prime humani-
tarian instrument that may have a significant humanizing influence on warfare.”); Waldemar
A. Solf, A Response to Douglas J. Feith’s Law in the Service of Terror—The Strange Case of
the Additional Protocol, 20 AKRON L. REV. 261, 289 (1986) (arguing that Feith overempha-
sized, and overreacted to, one provision of Protocol I).
51. According to Ambassador George Aldrich, the leader of the United States delegation
to the Diplomatic Conference which prepared the 1977 Protocols, several factors led to the
calling of the Conference, including disputes about the applicability of the Geneva and Hague
Conventions to internal armed conflicts and wars of national liberation, the position of guerrilla
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conference concluded, this great concern was no longer a real one. It
is encouraging, however, that, notwithstanding the 1987 position,
U.S. authorities have since recognized the force of parts of the Proto-
col as declaratory of customary international law—in the Gulf War,
for instance.52
The final exchange between King Henry and the French herald
concerning the removal of bodies makes the point that the obliga-
tions recognized at Agincourt extended after the battle. Those obli-
gations now also include obligations relating to information, which
are discussed in the next Part of these Remarks.
II. RULES FACILITATING COMMUNICATION
The heralds on the two sides at Agincourt watched the battle to-
gether from a hilltop but took no direct part in it. The Laws of Arms
made it quite clear that they were to be protected and to have com-
plete immunity.53 It was in everybody’s interests that the heralds be
able to pass freely to carry messages from one side to the other. The
rules and practice governing communications now have very exten-
sive application in warfare. For instance, in 1995 alone, the ICRC
forwarded 3,450,519 messages (mainly in connection with the con-
flicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia), reunited 11,217 fami-
lies, traced 14,687 people, and received 93,428 new tracing requests.54
                                                                                                                                     
warfare, the protection of prisoners of war, restraints on the use of weaponry, and the related
matter of the protection of civilians. See Aldrich, Some Reflections, supra note 50, at 132-36.
52. See, e.g., United States Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War—Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31 I.L.M. 612, 617, 624-25, 631-32
(1992) [hereinafter Report to Congress] (referring to and agreeing with aspects of Protocol I
and regarding those aspects as codification of the customary practice of nations). For a British
view, see Christopher Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol
of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH
LAW 63, 88 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993) [hereinafter GULF WAR] (concluding that the practice of
states in the Gulf War suggests that various provisions of Protocol I, such as the definition of a
military objective, are regarded as binding in customary law by those states).
53. See, e.g., M.H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 195 (1965).
Modern examples of this type of immunity include the “flags of truce” rules set forth in the
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, arts. 32-
34, 36 Stat. 2277, 2304. These rules state that a person bearing a white flag has a right to invio-
lability unless it is proved that he has taken advantage of his position to commit a treacherous
act. See id. at 2304. Likewise, Protocol I excepts inviolability for persons committing perfidious
acts. The Protocol defines “perfidious acts” as those acts which invite “the confidence of an
adversary and lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection un-
der the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confi-
dence.” Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 37, at 21.
54. See 1995 ICRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
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The ICRC established a Central Tracing Agency within the first dec-
ade of its existence during the Franco-Prussian War.
On the initiative of the U.S. delegation, and by referencing its
very recent experience in Vietnam, major improvements were made
to the law governing communications in 1977, in Protocol I. An entire
new section, entitled “Missing and Dead Persons,” was added to the
draft protocol prepared for the Diplomatic Conference. The section
begins with the principle that “the activities of the High Contracting
Parties, of the Parties to the conflict and of the international humani-
tarian organizations mentioned in the Conventions and in this Proto-
col shall be prompted mainly by the right of families to know the fate
of their relatives.”55
Obviously, the communicative role is not limited to armed con-
flict; it is inherent in the general law of diplomatic relations and has
an essential role during crises. For example, an ICRC update relating
to the hostage taking at the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru, after
first mentioning the relief assistance and medical and psychological
support being provided by the ICRC, reported the following under
the heading “Facilitating Dialogue”:
In this highly sensitive situation, the ICRC continues, at the request
of both the Peruvian government and MRTA [the group which had
taken the hostages], to act as a neutral intermediary to facilitate the
establishment of a dialogue between the parties, in the hope that this
will allow them to find a peaceful solution. The delegation therefore
actively maintains contact with both sides. In playing this role of fa-
cilitator, the ICRC assumes no responsibility for any proposals
passed on, decisions made or action taken by either of the two par-
ties. However, it has requested the parties to guarantee that they
would not resort to force or take any steps that may harm the hos-
tages or hamper ICRC delegates’ freedom of movement.56
The delegate at the center of the Lima crisis has recently pub-
lished a fascinating account of the role of the ICRC as a neutral in-
termediary, testing the action taken in Lima against the stated policy
55. See Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 32, at 19. For additional background concerning this
provision, see BOTHE ET AL., supra note 38, at 168-81, and ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 at 339-79 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
COMMENTARY].
56. ICRC, Update No. 1 on ICRC Activities Related to the Hostage Crisis in Lima (Jan.
10, 1997).
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of the ICRC.57 Of course, technology now greatly facilitates commu-
nication between parties in times of crisis or danger. At the height of
the Cold War, for example, President Kennedy and Premier Khrush-
chev agreed to establish a direct communications link between the
two governments.58 These developments can be seen in a wider con-
text of the developing obligation of states in whose territories or un-
der whose control dangerous activity is to occur to inform and warn
others who might be affected and, as appropriate, to negotiate.59
III. THE LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY
As the fate of Bardolph indicates, the individual soldier is re-
sponsible for breaches of the rules—a responsibility that can be en-
forced in a most extreme manner. The position of the commander,
however, is more complex. In the exchanges between the disguised
Henry and his men, it was ultimately agreed that a commander is not
responsible for the actions of his men.60 At the end of the war in the
Pacific, the United State Supreme Court’s decision in In re Ya-
mashita,61 established, in part, the contrary position. In addition, the
U.S. delegation to the Diplomatic Conference—following the U.S.
experience in the My Lai incident—actively worked to insert the fol-
lowing parallel provision into Article 86(2) of Protocol I:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from pe-
57. See Michel Minnig, The Lima Hostage Crisis: Some Comments on the ICRC’s Role as
“Neutral Intermediary”, 323 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 293, 302 (1998) (concluding that the ulti-
mate act of the humanitarian intermediary is to go as far as it possibly can, “to the point where
it borders on the political sphere, while affirming more strongly than ever how different it is
from the latter”).
58. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Com-
munications Link, June 20, 1963, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 825.
59. See, e.g., International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts not
Prohibited by International Law, [1989] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 131, 141-42, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/423. The subsequent development of that text and related state practice (including
treaty making) in the environmental context is very helpfully reviewed in Phoebe N. Okowa,
Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agreements, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275
(1996).
60. See supra note 8.
61. 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946) (holding that various provisions of the Annex to the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, the Tenth Hague Convention, and the Geneva Red Cross Conven-
tion of 1929, “plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time specified was military governor of
the Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take such
measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of
war and the civilian population”).
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nal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or
had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures
within their power to prevent or repress the breach.62
Technological developments over the last two decades have en-
hanced the ability not just of senior military commanders but also of
political leaders to be in close contact with those in the field. Those
developments may highlight the failures of subordinates to comply
with the obligations of international citizenship and may bring with
them the prospect of the greater responsibility (including criminal re-
sponsibility) of the political leadership.63
Another complex and controversial issue is the position of sub-
ordinates who commit atrocities while acting under superior orders.
At times the British and American manuals of military law have
stated that superior orders provided a defense.64 But the contrary po-
sition has generally been adopted. For instance, following the Ameri-
can Civil War, Henry Wirz, the commandant of the Confederacy
Prison Camp at Andersonville, Georgia, was charged with maltreat-
ing prisoners of war. During the trial, the Judge Advocate admitted
that the accused acted under orders but responded that “‘[a] superior
officer cannot order a subordinate to do an illegal act, and if a subor-
dinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, both
the superior and the subordinate must answer for it.’”65 Wirz was
convicted and executed. One scholar, discussing Wirz’s case at the
end of World War I, commented that the unqualified acceptance of
the principle that a subordinate is not responsible for what he does
under orders of his superiors would make it practically impossible to
62. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 86(2), at 43.
63. See Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind: Titles and Articles
on the Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind Adopted by the Interna-
tional Law Commission on its Forty-Eighth Session [hereinafter ILC Draft Code], art. 6, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532 (1996), revised by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532/Corr. 1
and U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532/Corr.3; United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1017 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
64. See, e.g., GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 16 (1965).
65. George A. Finch, Editorial Comment, Superior Orders and War Crimes, 15 AM. J.
INT’L L. 440, 444 (1921).
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enforce proper penalties for violations of the laws of war designed to
humanize, if such be possible, that grim recourse.66
Later practice—notably the Charter establishing the Nuremberg
tribunal67 and the judgments of that tribunal—has established that
superior orders do not free a person from responsibility, although
such orders might be relevant, if justice so requires, in deciding on
the proper penalty.68 The tribunal noted that the provisions in its
Charter
are in conformity with the law of all nations. That a soldier was or-
dered to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war
has never been recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality . . . .
The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law
of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral
choice was in fact possible.69
The tribunal had earlier emphasized that “[c]rimes against inter-
national law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions
of international law be enforced.”70
In 1998, as I discuss later, the British House of Lords applied es-
sentially the same principle in ruling that General Pinochet, the for-
mer President of Chile, could not claim immunity against charges of
torture and hostage taking.71
66. See id. at 444-45.
67. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Annex, art. 8, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284.
68. The matter is of some complexity and dispute. Compare A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE
BATTLEFIELD 143-48 (1996) (discussing military discipline and the virtual demise of the supe-
rior orders defense during the Nuremberg trial) with YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF
‘OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS’ IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965). Dinstein writes:
Though theoretically and logically, the solution of the problems raised by this subject
[of obedience to superior orders] seems to be clear and simple—that is, the fact of
obedience to orders should be excluded as a defense per se, but permitted to be
taken into account, among other circumstances of the case, for the purpose of estab-
lishing a defence based on lack of mens rea—yet in practice, in the spheres of the
cases and of international legislation, international law seems still to be haunted by
the spectre of obedience to orders.
Id. at 253.
69. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946, at 224 (1947) [hereinafter
NUREMBERG TRIAL].
70. Id. at 223.
71. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE RULES
It is a commonplace that rules within a legal system vary in their
strength and legal significance. Newspaper headlines and television
screens declare that the law of armed conflict is constantly breached;
that it is a feeble thing; or even that it is nonexistent. As Cicero once
noted while serving as defense counsel in a criminal trial, “silent enim
leges inter arma,” or “[w]hen arms speak, the laws are silent.”72 There
is a great deal of truth in the impression given by the media. Dreadful
breaches of the rules are committed. To balance that, at least to some
extent, I now consider aspects of the legal character of the rules, and
I conclude by discussing the means of implementing them and ways
to enforce compliance.
A. The Autonomy of the Rules
The law applicable during a battle applies completely independ-
ently of the lawfulness or justness of the resort to armed force. Ac-
cordingly, one party to a conflict cannot claim to be excused from the
obligations imposed by this law on the basis that the other party is
the aggressor or in some other respect has breached the prohibitions
on the use of armed force that are found in the Charter of the United
Nations.73 As common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
makes clear: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and
to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”74
Protocol I, in addition to repeating that obligation in its Article 1,
makes explicit what is implicit in the italicized phrase just quoted. In
the preamble, the parties reaffirm that the provisions of the 1949
Conventions and the protocol “must be fully applied in all circum-
stances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, with-
out any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the
armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Par-
ties to the conflict.”75
The distinct existence and autonomous operation of this body of
law are further emphasized in the text of Protocol I:
72. 14 CICERO, PRO T. ANNIO MILONE ORATIO [THE SPEECH ON BEHALF OF TITUS
ANNIUS MILO] 11 (G.P. Goold ed. & N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1992). Cicero’s
client, Milo, was accused of murder. He was convicted and exiled. There is some doubt about
what, exactly, Cicero said at the trial.
73. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 4.
74. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 37, common art. 1 (emphasis added).
75. Protocol I, supra note 18, preamble, para. 5, at 7.
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The application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as
the conclusion of the agreements provided for therein, shall not af-
fect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. Neither the occupa-
tion of a territory nor the application of the Conventions and this
Protocol shall affect the legal status of the territory in question.76
Those provisions clearly reflect the proposition stated by Francis
Lieber and elaborated in the exchange between King Henry and his
men: disputes between princes and the rights or wrongs of the
princely positions do not affect the existence and application of the
laws governing armed conflict and protecting the victims of war.
Edmund Wilson, in his marvelous study of the literature of the
American Civil War, records a related exchange between General
Sherman, “confident and towering” after the taking of Atlanta, and
General John B. Hood, commander of the Confederate Army of
Tennessee.77 Sherman “deemed it to [be in] the interest of the United
States” to banish the entire population of Atlanta from their city.78
Hood replied that he could not refuse to comply:
And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you
propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all history of
war. In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you
will find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the
wives and children of a brave people.79
In Edmund Wilson’s words, “an extraordinary polemic” then
arose.80 Sherman plunged into a political indictment:
In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God
in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace and
prosperity, have plunged a nation into war, dark and cruel war—who
dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arse-
nals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of peaceful
ordnance-sergeants, seized and made ‘prisoners of war’ the very gar-
risons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long
before any overt act was committed by the (to you) hated Lincoln
Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion,
spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana; turned loose your
privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the
76. Id. art. 4, at 8.
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thousands, burned their houses, and declared, by an act of your
Congress, the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods
had and received!81
Hood’s reply related first to the usages followed in war by civi-
lized nations. He then indicated that the political issues were not for
him—or indeed for Sherman—to pursue:
The residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens a wide field
for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are committed to
me. I am only a general of one of the armies of the Confederate
States, charged with military operations in the field, under the direc-
tion of my superior officers, and I am not called upon to discuss with
you the causes of the present war, or the political questions which
led to or resulted from it. These grave and important questions have
been committed to far abler hands than mine, and I shall only refer
to them so far as to repel any unjust conclusion which might be
drawn from my silence.82
In response, Sherman did agree that “this discussion by two sol-
diers is out of place, and profitless.”83
The soldiers were, of course, right. To reiterate, it has long been
established that the rightness or lawfulness of the war or of its cause
has nothing to do with the law which governs the rights and duties of
the parties to the conflict, the combatants, and others caught up in
the conflict. It is troubling, therefore, to see some possible suggestion
in the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1996
Nuclear Weapons cases that the wall between the two areas of law
may be permeable. Two paragraphs of the opinion may be read as
indicating that the lawfulness of the resort to self-defense may be
relevant to the lawfulness of using nuclear weapons “in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which [a state’s] very survival would
be at stake.”84
81. Id. at 189.
82. Id. at 190.
83. Id. at 192.
84. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
¶ 97, at 263 (July 8); id. ¶ 95, at 262-63 (stating that although the “unique characteristics of nu-
clear weapons . . . seem[s] scarcely reconcilable” with the law applicable in armed conflict, the
use of nuclear weapons would not “necessarily be at variance” with those laws in extreme cir-
cumstances); see also id. ¶ 105(2)(E), at 266 (“[T]he threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to . . . the principles and rules of humanitarian law; [h]owever, . . . the
court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be law-
ful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense.”).
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B. The Stability of the Rules
The parties to the Geneva Conventions deny themselves the
freedom to vary their obligations by mutual agreement in so far as
any agreement would adversely affect the rights of those protected by
the Convention or Protocol.85 The stability of the rules in this context
is in stark contrast with the general ability of parties to vary their ob-
ligations under international law by mutual agreement.86 Like the
Geneva Conventions, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
in a provision included on the initiative of the Swiss Government,
constrains the power of parties. It prohibits a state from terminating
or suspending, by reason of a material breach by another party, the
operation of those treaty provisions “relating to the protection of the
human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in
particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against per-
sons protected by such treaties.”87
While the 1949 Geneva Conventions do reserve to parties the
power to withdraw from them, two significant limits reduce much of
the effect of that power. First, if the withdrawing state is involved in
an armed conflict, the withdrawal does not take effect until peace has
been concluded and operations relating to the protected persons have
been completed.88 And, second, the withdrawal has effect only in re-
spect to the withdrawing state, and it:
[S]hall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the con-
flict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law
85. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 37, common art. 6 (appearing as art. 7 in
Geneva Convention No. IV) (“No special agreement shall adversely . . . restrict the rights
which it confers upon [the protected individuals].”).
86. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 41, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 342 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (permitting, with some
restriction, “[t]wo or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty [to] conclude an agreement to
modify the treaty as between themselves alone”).
87. See id. art. 60(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; see also IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 190 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that these types of provi-
sions are intended to benefit individuals and not states and therefore are not dependent on per-
formance by other parties).
88. This is found in an article common to each of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra
note 37. See Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 37, art. 63 (“[A] denunciation [of the present
Convention] . . . shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until after operations
connected with the release and repatriation of the persons protected by the present Convention
have been terminated”); Geneva Convention No. II, supra note 37, art. 62 (same); Geneva
Convention No. III, supra note 37, art. 142 (same); Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 37,
art. 158 (same).
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of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience.89
Not only are the parties constrained in their freedom to reduce
the protection by agreement, responses to breach, and withdrawal,
but the individuals who are protected by the Conventions similarly
cannot themselves waive their rights.90
C. The Universality of the Rules
The legal strength of the obligations accepted by the parties to
the Conventions and Protocol I is emphasized in a further respect by
common Article 1, quoted above.91 Under that provision, the 188 par-
ties92 undertake not only that they will respect the obligations them-
selves, but also that they will “ensure respect” for the obligations.93
Those additional words, according to the commentary on the Con-
ventions and Protocol prepared by the ICRC, have real significance:
[I]n the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, each of the
other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) should endeav-
our to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention. The
proper working of the system of protection provided by the Conven-
tion demands in fact that the States which are parties to it should not
be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do
everything in their power to ensure that it is respected universally.94
Based on this interpretation, “the ICRC has taken a number of
steps, confidentially or publicly” to encourage all the states parties
89. This is found in an article common to each of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra
note 37. See Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 37, art. 63; Geneva Convention No. II, supra
note 37, art. 62; Geneva Convention No. III, supra note 37, art. 142; Geneva Convention No.
IV, supra note 37, art. 158.
90. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 37, common art. 7 (appearing as art. 8 in
Geneva Convention No. IV) (“[Protected individuals] may in no circumstances renounce in
part or in entirety the rights secured to them . . . .”).
91. See supra text accompanying note 74.
92. See ICRC, Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949
and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions as at 31 De-
cember 1997, 322 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 178, 181 (1998).
93. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 37, common art. 1 (emphasis added).
94. JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR, in 3 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 18
(Jean S. Pictet ed. & A.P. de Heney trans., International Committee of the Red Cross 1960)
(emphasis added).
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and certain particular states “to use their influence or offer their co-
operation to ensure respect for humanitarian law.”95 As the commen-
tary indicates, the obligations are obligations owed to the whole
world and are of multilateral concern.96
This interpretation can, of course, be challenged. The ICRC has
no specific authority to interpret the Geneva texts—although it may
well exercise real practical authority. Furthermore, the suggested du-
ties of other states parties are so general as to have little practical
bite, as opposed to the more specific duties discussed in Part V of
these Remarks. And yet the cries of humanity might well be seen as
requiring some actions by other parties to the Conventions to help
ensure respect. As a great British international lawyer has noted, the
Conventions are not simply expedient arrangements dependent on
the will of the two parties to the conflict and operating exclusively be-
tween them.97
D. The Underlying and Competing Moral and Military Considerations
Particular protective provisions are sometimes qualified by mili-
tary necessity—a fact that appears, for instance, in some of the Lie-
ber provisions quoted earlier.98 In addition, under the Geneva Con-
ventions, the grave breach of extensive destruction and appropriation
of property99—a crime subject to universal criminal jurisdiction100—is
subject to a limit of military necessity.101 There is authority, however,
95. ICRC, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 55, at 36.
96. See id.
97. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law: Considered from
the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 125-26 (1957) (“Such conventions
involve obligations of an absolute and . . . self-existent kind, the duty to perform which, once
assumed, is not . . . dependent on a reciprocal or corresponding performance by other par-
ties.”).
98. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 37, art. 50 (specifying this offense as a
grave breach).
100. See, e.g., id. art. 49 (stating that a party may bring persons alleged to have committed
grave breaches before that party’s courts “regardless of [the accused’s] nationality”).
101. This limit is expressed in an article common to three of the Geneva Conventions of
1949. See Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 37, art. 50 (grave breaches are specified acts
“not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”); Geneva Conven-
tion No. II, supra note 37, art. 51 (same); Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 37, art. 147
(same).
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for the proposition that this limit is available only when the treaty it-
self expresses it.102
By contrast, the moral or humanitarian element does have a
general role, even if a residual one, in the operation of the law. Thus,
Article 1(2) of Protocol I repeats wording which appears in the with-
drawal provisions from the Geneva Conventions quoted earlier: “In
cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agree-
ments, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from estab-
lished custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates
of public conscience.”103
The preamble to Protocol II, which applies to non-international
armed conflict, similarly recalls that “in cases not covered by the law
in force, the human person remains under the protection of the prin-
ciples of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.”104
This wording finds its origins in the work of a remarkable Rus-
sian diplomat and scholar, Fyodor Martens, who played a central role
in the work of the two Peace Conferences called by Czar Nicholas II
and held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. It was he who proposed the
generous humanitarian wording to resolve an impasse in the drafting
of the Hague Convention on the laws and customs of war.105
E. The Balance of Rights and Obligations
At least since Wesley Hohfeld’s work106—New Zealanders and
some others would say since John Salmond’s107—the correlation be-
102. See, e.g., G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 95-97 (1958).
103. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 1(2).
104. Protocol II, supra note 16, preamble, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
105. See, e.g., Vladimir Pustogarov, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-1909): A Humanist
of Modern Times, in 312 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 300, 311 (May/June 1996); Rupert Ticehurst,
The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125
(Mar./Apr. 1997).
106. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (examining judicial application of rights and du-
ties); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (a continuation of the earlier work).
107. JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW (1st ed. 1902),
discussed in ALEX FRAME, SALMOND, SOUTHERN JURIST 61-64 (1995). For a valuable contri-
bution to this area of study by a former member of Duke’s faculty, see The Case of the Inter-
rupted Whambler, in LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A SELECTION OF
READINGS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMMENTS PREPARED BY THE EDITOR 628-38 (temp. ed.
1949). Fuller’s volume also reprints related papers. See Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and
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tween rights and duties and between other jural postulates has be-
come an accepted part of legal analysis. This correlation and some of
the resulting complications are found at the heart of a controversial
provision of Protocol I, Article 44(3):
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from
the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish them-
selves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an at-
tack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognis-
ing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where,
owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so
distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, pro-
vided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an
attack in which he is to participate.108
The controversy about this provision mainly revolves around the
interpretation and application of the phrase “the nature of the hostili-
ties,” and the identification of the point at which arms are to be car-
ried openly. For instance, the United Kingdom, in ratifying the Pro-
tocol stated its understanding that
− [T]he situation in the second sentence . . . can only exist in an
occupied territory or in armed conflicts covered by paragraph
(4) of Article (1) [wars of national liberation].
− “[D]eployment” in paragraph 3(b) means any movement to-
wards a place from which an attack is to be launched.109
My interest in the provision is the link it makes between rights
and responsibilities. Combatants have certain powers (especially to
use force) and certain rights (especially to status as a prisoner of war
if captured), and they have certain obligations, including those im-
posed by Article 44(3). In general, if a combatant breaches his obliga-
tions and as a result becomes subject to prosecution for a war crime,
he loses neither his combatant status nor, if captured, his prisoner of
war status. Article 44(4) creates an exception, however. If a combat-
                                                                                                                                     
Terminology, 29 Yale L.J. 163 (1919), reprinted in Fuller, supra, at 639; Walter Wheeler Cook,
The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems, reprinted in Fuller, supra, at 653.
108. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 44(3).
109. ICRC, Ratification of the Additional Protocols by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, 322 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 186, 188 (Mar. 1998).
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ant is captured while failing to comply with the second sentence of
Article 44(3) quoted above, he forfeits his right to be a prisoner of
war. He must, however, be given protections equivalent in all re-
spects to those accorded to a prisoner of war including those avail-
able in a trial for any offenses. Accordingly, the implied sanction—
the loss of prisoner of war status—is only chimerical. The complexi-
ties of these provisions highlight the extreme difficulty of getting
agreement in this area.110
Lieber prepared his draft of General Orders No. 100 against a
strongly developed philosophical position that rights and obligations
are “inter-complementing”:
[R]ight and obligation are twins[,] . . . [they are] each other’s com-
plements, and cannot be severed without undermining the ethical
ground on which we standthat ground on which alone civilization,
justice, virtue, and real progress can build enduring monuments.
Right and obligation are the warp and the woof of the tissue of
man’s moral, and therefore, likewise, of man’s civil life. Take out the
one, and the other is in worthless confusion.111
In a nutshell “Right alone, despotism—duty alone, slavery.”112 In
Professor Carrington’s summation, Lieber’s conception “pairs duty
with right and elevates the values of process as the means by which
the nation can achieve relativist justice and thereby unite its diverse
and other conflicting interests to save the whole.”113 That conception
is not limited by national borders.
V. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
As the experience at Agincourt indicates, many of the obliga-
tions in war are negative: non-combatants are not to be attacked; pri-
vate property is not to be seized; heralds are not to be prevented from
carrying out their responsibilities. But as the cooperative clearing of
110. For valuable commentaries on “one of the most bitterly disputed articles” at the Dip-
lomatic Conference, see ICRC, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 55, at 521,
519-42; BOTHE ET AL., supra note 38, at 241-58.
111. James F. Childress, Francis Lieber’s Interpretation of the Laws of War: General Orders
No. 100 in the Context of His Life and Thought, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 34, 47 (1976) (quoting
FRANCIS LIEBER, 1 MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 264 (1881)).
112. Id. at 48. For a recent important development of the duty/right connection by a public
philosopher, see DAVID SELBOURNE, THE PRINCIPLE OF DUTY: AN ESSAY ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVIC ORDER (1994).
113. Carrington, Political Ethics, supra note 29, at 396.
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the battlefield and the related exchange of information reflect, some
of the obligations are positive. Henry Wirz was condemned in part
for failing to provide necessities to the prisoners of war in his charge
at Andersonville. At about the same time, the Maori order of the day
for a battle in New Zealand between Maori and British forces began
with a verse from the New Testament: “If thine enemy hunger, feed
him, if he thirst, give him drink.”114
But it was not in the United States or New Zealand that the
Good Samaritan principle took major operational form on the battle-
field. Rather it was at Solferino, near Mantua, in Northern Italy in
1859.
Henry Dunant, a young Swiss banker who had already had the
central part in founding the worldwide Young Men’s Christian Asso-
ciation, was expecting to discuss plans for major agricultural devel-
opments in Algeria with Napoleon III. In late June of 1859, he jour-
neyed to the area of Solferino in northern Italy to meet the Emperor.
Instead, he came upon the dreadful carnage of a battle that had just
ended there between Napoleon’s troops, supported by the Sardinians,
and the Austrians led by the young Emperor Franz Joseph. After just
one day there were more than 40,000 casualties—more than the total
New Zealand figure for World War II. It was the most destructive
day of battle since Waterloo.
Henry Dunant’s response was both immediate and long-term.
He organized the relief of the injured, and for several days he was
wholly immersed in that effort himself. Later, through constant effort
including his writing (particularly the haunting A Memory of
Solferino), and much travel, he promoted three key developments:
(1) the establishment in 1863 of the aid organization which became
the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as other re-
114. GILBERT MAIR, THE STORY OF GATE PA 30 (1937) (quoting Romans 12:20). The sol-
emn rules for pursuing the fighting, sent to the British Commanding Officer, were as follows:
Rule 1. If wounded or (captured) whole, and butt of the musket or hilt of the sword
be turned to me (he) will be saved.
Rule 2. If any Pakeha being a soldier by name, shall be travelling unarmed and meet
me, he will be captured, and handed over to the direction of the law.
Rule 3. The soldier who flees, being carried away by his fears, and goes to the house
of the priest with his gun (even though carrying arms) will be saved; I will not go
there.
Rule 4. The unarmed Pakehas, women and children will be spared.
The end. These are binding laws for Tauranga.
Id. at 10.
KEITH DONE FINAL.DOC08/20/99 4:32 PM
1112 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [48:1081
lated voluntary national organizations; (2) the preparation of a
statement of legal commitment, incorporated into the first Geneva
Convention of 1864, binding on belligerent states; and (3) the promo-
tion of the application of that law and the use of those organizations
in practice on the battlefield.
A fundamental proposition of the Geneva Conventions since the
first one was signed on August 22, 1864, is that the wounded and sick
of whatever nation “shall be collected and cared for.”115 This set of
positive obligations continues, in much more extensive form, both in
the books and in practice. The ICRC’s 1995 annual report records,
for instance, the actions of that body in supporting people deprived
of their freedom; in protecting civilian populations; in restoring fam-
ily links; in providing health care (for instance to amputees); in pro-
viding water supplies; and in delivering material assistance.116 In 1995,
that assistance included visits to 2,282 places of detention and to
146,585 detainees in fifty-eight countries;117 the sending of health
teams to twenty countries to provide drinking water or repair water
treatment and distribution facilities in regions affected by conflict;118
and the distribution of 115,228 tons of material aid (down from
206,800 tons in 1994), with more than half of the total value of assis-
tance going to central and eastern Europe.119 There was also ICRC
activity in the Americas: in Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, and
Haiti.120
That is part of the positive response to tragic situations around
the world. Further assistance is provided through the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and through na-
tional societies. The efforts of these societies are reported in World
Disasters Report, published annually by the Federation. In addition,
many other governmental and nongovernmental agencies provide as-
sistance to areas ravaged by conflicts.121
115. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field, art. 6 (1864).
116. See 1995 ICRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-30.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 31.
120. See id. at 32.
121. For a valuable account of some of the problems for humanitarian action arising from
collapsed states, see ADAM ROBERTS, HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN WAR: AID, PROTECTION
AND IMPARTIALITY IN A POLICY VACUUM (Adelphi Paper No. 305, 1996). One tragic demon-
stration was the killing of members of an International Red Cross mission in Chechnya in De-
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Positive duties to assist may arise not only from the law of the
land but also from professional ethical obligations. As the case of Dr.
Samuel A. Mudd, the man who treated John Wilkes Booth, shows,
these duties might be seen as conflicting with duties under national
law, such as the duty to report certain suspicious events to public
authorities. Such a clash gave rise to a most interesting debate in the
course of the preparation of a provision in Protocol II on the general
protection of medical duties. The draft provision would have given
extensive protection both to the carrying out of the duties and to the
related confidences:
1. In no circumstances shall any person be punished for carrying out
medical activities compatible with professional ethics, regardless of
the person benefiting therefrom.
. . .
3. No persons engaged in medical activities may be compelled to
give to any authority information concerning the sick and the
wounded under his care should such information be likely to prove
harmful to the persons concerned or their families. Compulsory
medical regulations for the notification of communicable diseases
shall however be respected.122
The first substantive provision emerged unscathed from the
Diplomatic Conference. The protection given by the other, however,
was narrowed in a most significant way:
3. The professional obligations of persons engaged in medical activi-
ties regarding information which they may acquire concerning the
wounded and sick under their care shall, subject to national law, be
respected.
4. Subject to national law, no person engaged in medical activities
may be penalised in any way by any party to the conflict for refusing
or failing to give information concerning the wounded and sick who
are, or who have been, under his care.123
The inclusion of the overriding references to national law dem-
onstrates the success of those in the Diplomatic Conference who
were emphasizing sovereignty over humanity. The Canadian delega-
tion, for instance, believed that the proposed paragraph three “could
                                                                                                                                     
cember 1996. See ICRC, 17 December 1996: Six Red Cross Staff Assassinated in Chechnya, 317
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 135 (Mar./Apr. 1997).
122. LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 38, at 361.
123. CDDH/II/295; XIII, 196, reprinted in LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 38, at 399 (emphases added); see also Protocol II, supra note 16, art. 10.
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be regarded as an infringement of sovereignty and should be de-
leted.”124 Following the unanimous adoption of the text of the new
paragraphs, the head of the Norwegian delegation in a formal decla-
ration took exactly the opposite position:
His Government deeply regretted the inclusion in . . . paragraphs [3
and 4] of the words “subject to national law.” It was unacceptable to
his Government that an international legal norm of the importance
of the Protocol should be made subject to the national law of any
country. In its view such a provision was contrary to the very essence
of the international law and would be extremely dangerous for the
whole body of humanitarian law. When the matter came up in ple-
nary, the Norwegian delegation would propose the deletion of those
words. To emphasize the importance that his delegation attached to
the matter, he wished to state that it was unlikely that Norway
would ratify Protocol II if the words “subject to national law” were
maintained.125
The words were maintained, and, ironically, Norway was among the
first twenty states to ratify the Protocol.
The international law obligation to help others in peril extends
beyond the battlefield to perilous peacetime activity at sea and in
outer space. The obligation of seafarers to go to the aid of those in
distress at sea has been traced back to statutes enacted as early as the
fourteenth century.126 In 1566, Pope Pius V added an express eco-
nomic incentive to support the demands of humanity, calling on
fishing vessels to come to the aid of ships in peril, and providing
payment to those who took that action.127 In modern statements of
the law, in international treaties, and in national legislation, seafar-
ers’ obligations are more extensive,128 reflecting the development of
124. CDDH/II/SR.28; XI, 281, reprinted in LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 38, at 399.
125. CDDH/II SR.46; XI, 513, reprinted in LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT, supra note 38, at 399; see also Waldemar A. Solf, Development of the Protection of
the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Under the Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET, supra note 50, at 237, 245 (stating that this
“deference to national law has been the subject of severe criticism”).
126. See 1 GILBERT CHARLES GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 369
n.2 (1932).
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 12, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
450 U.N.T.S. 82; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982); Safety of Life at Sea Convention
(SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 164 U.N.T.S. 113; Convention for the Unification of Cer-
KEITH DONE FINAL.DOC08/20/99 4:32 PM
1999] RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1115
better communications. In addition, coastal states are now obliged to
promote the establishment and maintenance of an adequate and ef-
fective search and rescue service to promote safety on and over the
sea. Meeting that obligation may also require regional arrangements.
The existence in international law of these positive duties to aid
those in peril can be contrasted with the reluctance of Anglo-
American law to impose such duties. A leading American textbook
on torts, for instance, states that “the law has persistently refused to
impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go
to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other
is in danger of losing his life.”129 Similarly, a major figure in the de-
velopment of criminal law throughout the Commonwealth denies
criminal liability in such cases: “A number of people who stand round
a shallow pond in which a child is drowning, and let it drown without
taking the trouble to ascertain the depth of the pond, are no doubt,
shameful cowards, but they can hardly be said to have killed the
child.”130
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court adopted a parallel
reading for the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee
when it held that Wisconsin state authorities were not obliged to take
positive action to protect the life and liberty of five-year-old Joshua
DeShaney, who had been subject to a series of beatings by his father,
even though the authorities had been notified about his very serious
plight.131 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the ma-
jority:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limita-
                                                                                                                                     
tain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658; In-
ternational Convention on Salvage, 1989, Apr. 28, 1989, Sen. Treaty Doc. 12, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991).
The law of outer space contains similar obligations. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 6
I.L.M. 386 (1967); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No.
6599.
129. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375
(5th ed. 1984).
130. 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 10
(1883).
131. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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tion on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain mini-
mal levels of safety and security.132
Justice Brennan, with Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dis-
sented, contending that the majority had taken the wrong perspec-
tive. Brennan was not arguing for a general duty. Rather, in his view,
Wisconsin had taken action with respect to Joshua and children like
him by setting up a system whereby all reports of child abuse were
channeled to the Department of Social Services.133 In doing so,
“Wisconsin law invites—indeed, directs—citizens and other govern-
mental entities to depend on local departments of social services . . .
to protect children from abuse.”134 That action, in Brennan’s mind,
triggered related duties.135 As Justice Blackmun stated in a separate
dissent, “the facts here involve not mere passivity, but active state in-
tervention in the life of Joshua DeShaney—intervention that triggered
a fundamental duty to aid the boy once the State learned of the se-
vere danger to which he was exposed.”136 Justice Blackmun rejected
the drawing of “a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction,”137
stating that “such formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpreta-
tion of the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”138
The willingness of the international legislator to impose positive
obligations to assist those in peril should at least give us pause as we
consider the common law traditions—at least as indicated in the
above three items from private law, criminal law, and constitutional
law. Is our moral sense so weak that the parable of the Good Samari-
tan is to apply in our law—if it applies at all—only in negative
ways?139
132. Id. at 195.
133. See id. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 208-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphases added).
137. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Professor Lawrence Tribe has developed this perspec-
tive issue, drawing on his formidable scientific knowledge. See Lawrence H. Tribe, The Curva-
ture of the Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8-14 (1989); see also The Supreme Court 1988 Term: Leading Cases, Affirmative Con-
stitutional Obligations of Government Officials, 103 HARV. L. REV. 167 (1989).
139. For a more general discussion, see THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
AID (Michael A. Menlow & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1993); see also Kenneth Keith, Pol-
icy and Law: Politicians and Judges (and Poets), in COURTS AND POLICY: CHECKING THE
BALANCE 117 (B.D. Gray & R.B. McClintock eds., 1995).
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VI. SANCTIONS AND FORCES FOR COMPLIANCE
The foregoing account establishes the existence of an extensive
body of law designed to govern international and internal armed con-
flict, and especially to protect the victims of that conflict. No doubt
there are flaws in that law, as current efforts to get wider ratification
of the conventions banning antipersonnel mines, which kill about 200
people a week, demonstrate. But to quote Professor Meron, “In
Henry’s time, as still today, disrespect for the existing rules, rather
than the absence of rules, was the principal problem.”140 Major inter-
national conferences held in 1993 and 1995 confirmed the shocking
facts, deplored the gross and persistent violations of the law, and
made strong calls for compliance with the existing law and for use of
the existing methods of implementation.141
The fate of Bardolph—like that of Henry Wirz and that of those
being tried in Arusha and The Hague by the tribunals for Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia—dramatically illustrates the sanctions of
the law of armed conflict in operation. Individuals can be tried either
by their own authorities or by those of the other party to the conflict
for their own breaches of the rules, as well as for breaches committed
by those for whom they are responsible. Reprisals—threatened or ac-
tual—such as those following the killing of the boys at the back of the
English position, have also had a long-standing role in warfare.
But such sanctions are necessarily taken after the event. Initial
compliance is preferable. One important—probably essential—step
towards that goal is the clear statement and understanding of the
rules in advance of conflicts. Holinshed’s Chronicle indicates that the
rule Bardolph breached was stated before the event.142 Lieber and
Halleck were also motivated by that preventive purpose when they
prepared General Orders No. 100. So, too, were those responsible for
the Geneva and Hague Conventions first negotiated in the latter half
of the nineteenth century.
140. Meron, supra note 5, at 45 (emphasis added).
141. See, e.g., ICRC, Final Declaration of the International Conference for the Protection of
War Victims, 310 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 79 (Jan./Feb. 1996) [hereinafter ICRC, Final Decla-
ration 1996]; ICRC, Resolutions of the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent: Resolution 1—International Humanitarian Law: From Law to Action Report on the
Follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, 310 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 55 (Jan./Feb. 1996); ICRC, Resolutions of the 26th International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent: Resolution 2—Protection of the Civilian Population in Period of
Armed Conflict, 310 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 55 (Jan./Feb. 1996).
142. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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Compliance may also be promoted by greater appreciation of
the humanitarian, moral, religious, military, or political values and
purposes underlying the law. Shakespeare captured that truth in his
marvelous line: “[W]hen Lenity and Cruelty play for a Kingdom, the
gentler gamester is the soonest winner.”143
Five hundred and fifty years later, United States rules of en-
gagement in Vietnam essentially repeated Henry’s rule and its justifi-
cation, although hardly with the same force and elegance:
a. The use of unnecessary force resulting in non-combatant casual-
ties and property loss will embitter the population and make the
long term goal of pacification more difficult and costly.
b. The VC/NVA exploit incidents of non-combatant casualties and
destruction of property . . . to foster resentment and to alienate the
people against the Government.144
Those fragments indicate aspects of the answer to the question:
what are the forces for compliance with the law and in particular the
institutions and methods promoting compliance?
The answers could fill a book and have in fact filled several.145
The answers incorporate several variables. A first variable concerns
timing. The methods may operate before, during, or after the conflict.
The Conventions and the Protocol place specific obligations on states
to disseminate knowledge of the law, notably to their armed forces
but also generally to the public. The international and national Red
Cross and Red Crescent movements can, and often do, play a notable
educational role, particularly in non-international armed conflict.
Some of that educational effort can emphasize the general prin-
ciples underlying the law, particularly the protection of those who are
not or who are no longer involved in the combat, the protection of
medical and other humanitarian efforts, and the prohibition on
methods and means of warfare which cause unnecessary suffering.
The 1978 statement prepared under the auspices of the ICRC and
appended to these Remarks captures their essence in seven proposi-
tions set out on a single page. The role for general principle is seen,
for instance, in debates about the legality of the use of nuclear weap-
143. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 5, at act 3, sc. 6, ll. 119-20.
144. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIREPOWER IN THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM, Rule 4 (Combat Operations), reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 17,551, 17,556 (1975).
145. See, e.g., IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Frits Kalsho-
ven & Yves Sandoz eds., 1989); ICRC, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 55;
BOTHE ET AL., supra note 38.
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ons, which was the subject of a fascinating advisory opinion of the
ICJ concerning the use of nuclear weapons given in July 1996.146
The process leading up to that opinion illustrates another point:
the ability of nongovernmental bodies, such as the International Phy-
sicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, to develop world public
opinion and the potential effects of such opinion on governmental ac-
tors. Governments were forced, in some cases against their inclina-
tion, to debate the legality of the use of nuclear weapons before the
International Court by reference to “principles and rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.”147 Members of
the universities, of course, can and do play a significant role in such
processes. For example, Roger Clark, a compatriot and former col-
league at the Victoria University of Wellington appeared in the ICJ
nuclear weapons case as counsel for Samoa and one of a team repre-
senting small Pacific island countries. He has since published a valu-
able collection of relevant documents from that proceeding.148
Countries’ obligation to disseminate knowledge of the law of
war, which of course applies both before and during an armed con-
flict, is strengthened by the obligation that Protocol I places on par-
ties to “ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to
advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the applica-
tion of [the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I] and on the appro-
priate instruction to be given to the armed forces.”149 A notable in-
stance of a country fulfilling these obligations is the United States use
of over 200 lawyers during the course of the Gulf War.150 General
Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that
“[d]ecisions were impacted by legal considerations at every level,
[and the law of war] proved invaluable in the decision-making proc-
ess.”151 The Pentagon report records that the Secretary of Defense
146. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
147. Id. ¶ 74, at 256; see also id. ¶¶ 51, 89, 90, at 247, 261 (referring to general principles of
neutrality and humanitarian law).
148. See THE CASE AGAINST THE BOMB: MARSHALL ISLANDS, SAMOA AND SOLOMON
ISLANDS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN ADVISORY PROCEEDINGS ON
THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Roger S. Clark & Madeleine
Sann eds., 1996).
149. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 82, at 41.
150. See Steven Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 52, 54. For the
British position, see David Garratt, The Role of Legal Advisers in the Armed Forces, in GULF
WAR, supra note 52, at 55.
151. Report to Congress, supra note 52, at 615.
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asked the General Counsel to give opinions on Department of De-
fense targeting policies, the rules of engagement, the rules governing
maritime interception operations, and issues relating to prisoners of
war.152 Advice was also given at every level of command to ensure
that the targets selected for attack were consistent with United States
law of war obligations.153
Methods of enforcing the law of war that operate after the event
include criminal prosecutions by national courts of the parties, third
countries, military tribunals, and international tribunals; disciplinary
processes; national or international inquiries; mediation processes;
and civil proceedings in national or international courts. The War
Crimes Act of 1996,154 signed by President Clinton on August 21,
1996, gives U.S. courts extensive jurisdiction over war crimes in ac-
cordance with the 1949 Conventions.155 Nonetheless, further steps
remain to be taken.
As the above list indicates, the second variable is whether to use
national or international processes. For example, criminal prosecu-
tions resulting from the tragedy in Rwanda are taking place both in
national courts and in the international criminal tribunal established
by the U.N. Security Council. That tribunal, however, like those es-
tablished at Nuremberg and Tokyo and for the former Yugoslavia, is
merely ad hoc; proposals for a permanent International Criminal
Court—first made over a century ago—have finally borne fruit, and
in July 1998 a diplomatic conference adopted the Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC).156
Provisions of that statute played an important part in the recent
judgment by the House of Lords, acting in its role as the highest court
in the United Kingdom, in ruling that General Pinochet, the former
President of Chile, could not defeat his extradition to Spain by
claiming “head of state” immunity or asserting the “act of state” de-
152. See id. at 617.
153. See id.
154. Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. II 1996)); see
also William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on Signing the War Crimes Act of 1996, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1323 (Aug. 21, 1996) (stating that the War Crimes Act “provides the United States
with clearer authority to prosecute violations of the laws of war”).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. II 1996). The War Crimes Act was amended in 1997 such that
it now punishes commission of a “war crime,” which is more broadly defined than its predeces-
sor offense: “grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.” Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 583, 111 Stat. 2386, 2436
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. III 1997)).
156. Rome Statute, supra note 63.
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fense.157 Also playing an important role were broader doctrines of in-
dividual responsibility for gross breaches of human rights, including
torture, hostage taking, and genocide.158 As the provisions of the ICC
statute and the Pinochet judgment indicate, there is now considerable
overlap between the responsibilities of individuals (and states) under
national and international human rights law.159 One of the judges in
the majority in the Pinochet case, Lord Nicholls, in rejecting the
claim of immunity, affirmed that “international law has made plain
that certain types of conduct, including torture and hostage-taking,
are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone.”160 He emphasized
that this principle applies at least as much to heads of state as to eve-
ryone else: “the contrary conclusion would make a mockery of inter-
national law.”161 In support of this proposition, he quoted the follow-
ing passage from the Nuremberg judgment: “‘The principle of
international law which, under certain circumstance, protects the rep-
resentatives of a state cannot be applied to acts condemned as crimi-
nal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter
themselves behind their official position to be freed from punish-
ment.’”162
Such court processes are essentially backward looking: they de-
termine guilt or innocence by reference to past events. They can, of
course, provide a critical basis for future understanding by establish-
ing an authoritative historical record through the due process of law.
But such processes can also be given a more explicitly forward look-
ing role. For instance, the International Humanitarian Fact Finding
Commission set up under Protocol I has the dual role of inquiring
into serious breaches of the Conventions and the Protocol and
“facilitat[ing], through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude
157. See The Queen v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte,
[1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456, 1472 (H.L.) (citing Article 27 of the Rome Statute, which states that
heads of state are not exempt from criminal prosecution).
158. See id. at 1471-72 (pointing to provisions on individual responsibility in several interna-
tional conventions).
159. See 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law, 324 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1 (Sept. 1998); R. Quentin-
Baxter, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law—Confluence or Conflict?, 1985 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT’L L. 94, 96-97.
160. Ex parte Pinochet, [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1500 (per Lord Nicholls).
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing the role of individual
responsibility in the Nuremberg trials).
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of respect” for them.163 This dual function is also found in the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, presided over by
Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
A third variable to consider is whether the processes will be con-
cerned with determining the responsibility of individuals or of states.
Article 91 of Protocol I, based on the 1899 Hague Convention, em-
phasizes state responsibility: “A Party to the conflict which violates
the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”164
A process which focuses on individual responsibility and which
may result in a person’s conviction and sentencing must comply with
principles of due process. Such a defendant must have the opportu-
nity to present his own evidence and to test the prosecution’s evi-
dence on an equal footing.165 Processes with other goals, however,
may be more inquisitorial and less formal.
A related variable concerns whether the process is public or pri-
vate. The ICRC, for instance, relies heavily on confidentiality as a
means of facilitating access, assistance, and influence. As Caroline
Moorehead noted in relation to the refusal to condemn the bom-
bardment of Sonderborg in 1864, “[n]o one could be both Good Sa-
maritan and arbiter at once.”166 In general, the International Humani-
163. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 90(2)(c); see also Note, Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law: The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, 7 CRIM. L.F.
485 (1996). The first president of the Commission, Erich Kussbach, provides valuable back-
ground information in The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, 43 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 174 (1994). Further information is now available on the Commission’s web site,
<http://www.ihffc.org>.
164. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 91, at 45.
165. Monroe Leigh and Christine Chinkin had a fascinating exchange concerning a proce-
dural ruling allowing anonymous witnesses by the former Yugoslav tribunal. See Monroe
Leigh, Editorial Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Ac-
cused, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 235 (1996) (concluding that the use of anonymous witnesses cannot be
reconciled with the right to a fair trial in international law); Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial
Comment, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 75 (1997) (arguing that the
need to protect victims of armed conflict must be considered); Monroe Leigh, Editorial Com-
ment, Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 80 (1997)
(replying to Chinkin’s objections). This exchange was referred to in a judgment of my court.
See R. v. Hines [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 529, 548 (holding that witnesses could not give evidence
anonymously).
166. MOOREHEAD, supra note 2, at 43. For conflicting practices and statements, see id. at
xxv-xxx (describing the ICRC’s 1942 decision not to speak out publicly against the Holocaust);
id. at 255-56 (praising the ICRC’s “courage and vision” in condemning gas warfare in World
War I); id. at 310-14 (noting the ICRC’s unsuccessful attempt to halt Italian use of gas warfare
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tarian Fact Finding Commission acts privately and does not publish
its reports unless the parties agree otherwise.
In addition to the immediate parties to the conflict, third parties
may also be involved in the process. One should recall that all states
parties to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I have the broad
obligation to ensure respect for their provisions.167 One should also
remember the largely neglected provisions for “protecting powers”—
states, neutral in the conflict, that protect the interests of one or the
other party to a given conflict. The ICRC, the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, and the U.N., through its various bodies and
permanent and ad hoc courts, tribunals, and commissions, can also
become involved—either at a party’s initiative or even unilaterally.
Protocol I also provides for meetings of all the parties to the treaties
“to consider general problems concerning [their] application”168 and
requires the parties “in situations of serious violations of the Conven-
tions or . . . Protocol . . . to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation
with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations
Charter.”169
The methods might be employed on or off the battlefield. A no-
table, but controversial, battlefield method is the taking of reprisals.170
Recall, for example, King Henry’s order on discovering the slaughter
of the boys.171 Steps have been taken, especially in Protocol I,172 to
limit a party’s power to take reprisals, but some critics have con-
                                                                                                                                     
in Ethiopia); id. at 561 (describing a 1947 article by Max Huber arguing that the ICRC should
not resort to public protests); id. at 689-90 (describing the ICRC’s 1994 public warning that
Rwanda and the surrounding region were “slid[ing] inexorably towards chaos”). According to
Georges Willemin and Roger Heacock, “[s]olemn appeals are . . . only the tip of the iceberg.
They are only issued in case of extreme necessity and usually out of despair.” GEORGES
WILLEMIN & ROGER HEACOCK, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 70
(1984). The practice continues to evolve, as appears from a recent talk by the head of the
ICRC’s Media Services, see Urs Boegli, A Few Thoughts on the Relationship Between Hu-
manitarian Agencies and the Media, 325 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 627 (Dec. 1998) (discussing the
complexities of gathering and conveying information on humanitarian emergencies), and a
statement by the ICRC on September 15, 1998, concerning the situation in Kosovo, see ICRC,
Public Statement by the ICRC on the Situation in Kosovo, 325 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 725 (Dec.
1998) (providing an example of a public statement on humanitarian issues).
167. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
168. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 7, at 9.
169. Id., art. 89, at 43.
170. See generally FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971) (discussing the his-
tory and law of wartime reprisals).
171. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
172. See Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51(6), at 26 (“Attacks against the civilian population
or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.”).
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tended that humanity cannot be realistically preferred to military and
political necessity in this way. Francis Lieber, while permitting pro-
tective retribution to be used “cautiously and unavoidably,” recog-
nized that “[u]njust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belliger-
ents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and
by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of sav-
ages.”173
In 1983, the United States Catholic Conference, in its Pastoral
Letter on War and Peace, came out in an absolute way against repri-
sals when discussing the possibility of nuclear reprisals:
Retaliatory action whether nuclear or conventional which would
indiscriminately take many wholly innocent lives, lives of people
who are in no way responsible for reckless actions of their govern-
ment, must also be condemned. This condemnation, in our judg-
ment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy
cities after our own have already been struck. No Christian can
rightfully carry out orders or policies deliberately aimed at killing
non-combatants.
We make this judgment at the beginning of our treatment of nu-
clear strategy precisely because the defense of the principle of non-
combatant immunity is so important for an ethic of war and because
the nuclear age has posed such extreme problems for the principle.174
In summary, the world community has established a set of insti-
tutions and methods for both implementing and writing the substan-
tive law of war. But still there are tragic erosions of the law and
dreadful violations of human values. The world community recog-
nized this unfortunate fact in the 1993 International Conference for
the Protection of War Victims175 and the 1995 International Confer-
ence of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.176 Both conferences called
for the more extensive and effective use of the methods of implemen-
tation which already exist. And yet the carnage continues; the meth-
ods of implementation are often ignored. For instance, criminal
173. General Orders No. 100, supra note 24, art. 28, at 7.
174. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD’S
PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE 47 (1983).
175. See ICRC, Final Declaration of the International Conference for the Protection of War
Victims, 296 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 401 (Sept./Oct. 1993). The participants at the conference
solemnly decried the fact that war, violence and hatred spread throughout the world; that fun-
damental rights of persons are violated in an increasingly grave and systematic fashion; and
that obligations under international humanitarian law are constantly violated. See id.
176. See ICRC, Final Declaration 1996, supra note 141.
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prosecutions are rare, even taking account of current national and in-
ternational practice; protecting powers are almost never appointed;
the International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission, estab-
lished in 1991, has yet (in 1998) to receive its first complaint; and too
many combatants are ignorant of the basic restraints on their powers
to use deadly force.
What can be done? I emphasize two matters. The first relates to
the more positive reasons for compliance—“the gentler gamester is
the soonest winner.”177 The second relates to the role of universities,
law schools, and scholars.
Humanitarianism and political advantage may often dictate the
same result. So, too, may strategic and economic considerations. King
Henry’s words,178 the related American rules for Vietnam,179 and
many other statements emphasize the political advantage to be
gained from compliance with the law. Five incidents over the last two
centuries show the possible linkages. They involve a writer, a soldier-
politician, a naval officer, a scientist, and a wartime prime minister.
The first incident demonstrates that humanitarianism might
alone operate as a constraint. George Orwell, fighting in the Spanish
Civil War, refrained from shooting a man who jumped from a trench:
He was half-dressed and was holding up his trousers with both hands
as he ran . . . .  I did not shoot partly because of that detail about the
trousers. I had come here to shoot at “Fascists;” but a man who is
holding up his trousers isn’t a “Fascist,” he is visibly a fellow-
creature, similar to yourself, and you don’t feel like shooting at
him.180
In this instance, Orwell was going further than the law required.
To paraphrase Grotius, one of the founders of international law, this
was perhaps a case of a sense of shame forbidding what the law per-
mits.181
177. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 5, at act 3, sc. 6, ll. 112-13.
178. See id.
179. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
180. WALZER, supra note 5, at 140 (quoting 2 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND
LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 254 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968)).
181. See 3 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch X, pt. I(2) (1646), reprinted in 2
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (NO. 3) 716 (James B. Scott ed. & Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (quoting the character of Agamemnon from Seneca’s play The
Trojan Women: “What law permits, this sense of shame forbids to do.”).
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But more often, especially for the commanders, other reasons,
including military discipline, will support any humanitarian impera-
tive. Napoleon, reflecting Henry’s reasoning from centuries earlier,
once remarked that nothing would “disorganise an army more or ruin
it more completely than pillaging.”182 One of his biographers, writing
of his brilliantly successful Italian campaign, assessed the qualities
contributing to that success:
The first quality was discipline. Napoleon with his legal forbears was
a great person for law and order. He insisted that officers issue a re-
ceipt for everything requisitioned, be it a box of candles or a sack of
flour. If his soldiers stole or damaged, he arranged compensation.
He forbade looting and he ordered a grenadier who stole a chalice in
the Papal States to be shot in front of the army.183
Another reason for observing a minimum of humanitarian con-
duct is military tradition. It was tradition that weighed with Admiral
Canaris of the German Navy when, in September 1941, he protested
against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
For him the fact that the USSR had not ratified the 1929 Convention
was not decisive:
[T]he principles of general international law on the treatment of
prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century these have gradually
been established along the lines that war captivity is neither revenge
nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of
which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in
the war. This principle was developed in accordance with the view
held by all armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or
injure helpless people . . . .  The decrees for the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war enclosed are based on a fundamentally different
view-point.184
According to the Nuremberg Tribunal, “[t]his protest, which
correctly stated the legal position, was ignored. The defendant,
[Wilhelm] Keitel made a note on this memorandum: ‘The objections
arise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare. This is the de-
182. Panel Discussion, Compliance During Hostilities, 1964 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 82,
91-92 (comments of Gordon B. Baldwin).
183. VINCENT CRONIN, NAPOLEON BONAPARTE: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY 127 (1971);
see also R. R. Baxter, Forces for Compliance with the Law of War, 1964 PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L
L. 85-86 (considering the connection between military discipline and compliance with interna-
tional law).
184. NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 69, at 232 (alteration in original).
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struction of an ideology. Therefore I approve and back the meas-
ures.’”185 The tribunal ultimately found Keitel guilty.186
Compliance with the law might also promote military advantage.
Limited personnel, equipment, and munitions are better directed at
military objectives. Lord Blackett, a leading British physicist, made
this comment on area bombing in World War II: “The area bombing,
which was originally adopted just because of the inability to do preci-
sion bombing, did little to help win the war and greatly increased our
difficulties afterwards.”187
Winston Churchill, near the end of World War II, made Black-
ett’s point very forcibly and added an economic consideration. In a
minute prepared just after the bombing of Dresden that was directed
to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chief of Air Staff and
which, in its first form, had referred to the “bombing of German cit-
ies simply for the sake of increasing the terror,”188 he declared:
It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of so
called “area bombing” of German cities should be reviewed from
the point of view of our own interests. If we come into control of an
entirely ruined land, there will be a great shortage of accommoda-
tion for ourselves and our Allies: and we shall be unable to get
housing materials out of Germany for our own needs because some
temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans them-
selves. We must see to it that our attacks do not do more harm to
ourselves in the long run than they do to the enemy’s immediate war
effort.189
The broad point—in a sense an obvious one—is that we should
not depend solely on formal means of enforcing law. Compliance
must in essence be based on the understanding and acceptance of the
values underlying the law. The too ready acceptance of the proposi-
tion that law disappears in the face of war must be confronted and
185. Id. at 232.
186. See id. at 291.
187. P.M.S. BLACKETT, MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
26 (1948), quoted in Hans Blix, Area Bombardment: Rules and Reasons, 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
31, 60-61 (1978).
188. Winston Churchill, Memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff (Mar. 28, 1945) (first form), in
3 SIR CHARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST
GERMANY 1939-1945, at 112 (1961).
189. Winston Churchill, Memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff (Apr. 1, 1945) (second form),
in 3 WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 188, at 117.
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defeated by emphasizing the essential values on which the law is
based.
Finally, I come to the role of the universities and of scholars, and
especially of legal scholars. This role is to be seen in the context of
the obligations of the states parties to the various treaties to make
them better known. The law schools have a central part in that dis-
seminating process. Their role is to be seen in the broader context of
the place of international law in law schools, in legal practice and in
national law.190
Law professors share that responsibility with colleagues in many
other disciplines. The various collections of papers I have consulted
in preparing these Remarks have a strikingly diverse authorship—
historians, geographers, philosophers, economists, theologians, social
scientists, sociologists, political scientists, war studies experts, and in-
ternational relations experts, as well as politicians, military officers,
journalists, and poets. Lawyers should be concerned that, with some
notable exceptions, they are not better represented, and that scholars
in other areas do not make better use of legal material. The out-
standing Just and Unjust Wars,191 on which I have drawn heavily,
helps make the point: when Michael Walzer was writing the first edi-
tion of that book, he had as a colleague in the law school at his uni-
versity an outstanding scholar in the law of armed conflict who at the
time was a senior member of the U.S. delegation to the Diplomatic
Conference that drew up Protocols I and II.192 The book would have
benefited from a closer understanding of the existing law and of the
very processes then underway. Those processes and the new law itself
might well also have benefited.
The broader understanding that comes from an interdisciplinary
endeavor is also critical for the role of scholar as lawmaker—or at
least as the adviser or persuader of lawmakers. Francis Lieber, to re-
turn to that notable scholar, was not only the primary drafter of Gen-
190. The Institut de Droit International adopted an important resolution on this subject in
1997. See Draft Resolution, The Teaching of International Law, 67 ANNUAIRE 121 (1997). In
the resolution, the Institut emphasizes that international law increasingly affects the content of
municipal law and that a knowledge of international law is necessary to discharge both a wide
range of professional responsibilities at the national level and the responsibilities of individuals
in an increasingly cohesive international society. Accordingly it recommends that no law stu-
dent should graduate or enter law practice without having had a foundation course or courses
on public and private international law. See id. at 201-02.
191. WALZER, supra note 5.
192. That colleague was Richard Baxter of the Harvard Law School.
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eral Orders No. 100. According to Professor Blumtschli, an original
member of the Institut de Droit International, Lieber also had great
influence in the founding of that very important nongovernmental
body.193 Lieber was not enthusiastic about settling disputed issues of
international law through permanent international congresses con-
sisting of governmental representatives. Rather, adopting arguments
which preceded by some generations those which led to the setting up
of the American Law Institute,194 he looked to the contribution of
scholars without any special connection with the cases in question,
appealing to reason, justice and equity alone. He anticipated that
uniting the most prominent jurists of the law of nations in their pri-
vate capacities should settle unresolved issues, like Hugo Grotius
did—by the strength of the great arguments of justice.
The cynics will deny the objectivity which Lieber sought. Their
view has gained recent support from reviews of the work of the
American Law Institute.195 But Lieber’s opinion, like his own work,
does raise enduring questions about the sources of the law and the
role of independent scholars. I leave you with a possible project aris-
ing out of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weap-
ons. While sharply divided on the central substantive issue, the Court
made an important unanimous ruling on a matter of process: “There
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control.”196
In December 1996, the General Assembly of the United Nations
took note of the Court’s opinion, underlined that unanimous conclu-
193. See Root, supra note 28, at 464.
194. See, e.g., John W. Salmond, The Literature of Law, 22 COLUM. L REV. 197, 201-02
(1922). Salmond’s work was used a short time later by a most distinguished committee—
headed by Elihu Root, and including Benjamin N. Cardozo, Arthur L. Corbin, John W. Davis,
Learned Hand, Roscoe Pound, Harlan F. Stone, Henry W. Taft, John H. Wigmore, and Samuel
Williston—in support of its recommendation for the establishment of an American Law Insti-
tute. The report is reprinted in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 1923-1998, at 173, 230 (1998). Salmond is referred to in the
report as an Australian. While he was born in England and taught briefly in Australia, he is
often acknowledged as New Zealand’s greatest lawyer. See FRAME, supra note 107, at 11
(referring to Salmond as “New Zealand’s most influential and renowned jurist”).
195. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rule Making
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 (1995); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
196. Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
267 (July 8) (emphasis added).
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sion, and called upon all states to fulfil that obligation immediately.197
It urged the states to commence multilateral negotiations in 1997 that
would lead to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention
prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stock-
piling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for
their elimination.198
Scholars around the world will see this call as extending to them
and not as being limited to governments. They will not be deterred by
the opposition of major states to that call. They will emphasize the
principle of good faith, as the ICJ did when it ruled on nuclear testing
over twenty years ago: “One of the basic principles governing the
creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source,
is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in in-
ternational co-operation, in particular in an age when this co-
operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential.”199
197. See General and Complete Disarmament, U.N. GAOR First Comm., 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/51/45 (1996).
198. See id.
199. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 473 (Dec. 20).
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APPENDIX
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS200
1. Persons hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part
in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and physical
and moral integrity. They shall in all circumstances be protected
and treated humanely without any adverse distinction.
2. It is forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders or who
is hors de combat.
3. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for by the
party to the conflict which has them in its power. Protection also
covers medical personnel, establishments, transports and maté-
rial. The emblem of the red cross (red crescent, red lion, and
sun) is the sign of such protection and must be respected.
4. Captured combatants and civilians under the authority of an ad-
verse party are entitled to respect for their lives, dignity, per-
sonal rights and convictions. They shall be protected against all
acts of violence and reprisals. They shall have the right to corre-
spond with their families and to receive relief.
5. Everyone shall be entitled to benefit from fundamental judicial
guarantees. No one shall be held responsible for an act he has
not committed. No one shall be subjected to physical or mental
torture, corporal punishment or cruel or degrading treatment.
6. Parties to a conflict and members of their armed forces do not
have an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare. It is
prohibited to employ weapons or methods of warfare of a na-
ture to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.
7. Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the ci-
vilian population and combatants in order to spare civilian
population and property. Neither the civilian population as such
nor civilian persons shall be the object of attack. Attacks shall
be directed solely against military objectives.
200. International Committee of the Red Cross, 1978 Red Cross Fundamental Rules of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 469, 470 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989).
